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Articles
The Constitutionality of New





The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
"federal magistrates account for a staggering volume of judicial
work" and are "indispensable."' Numerous statistics show an
expansion of magistrate activities.2 Given heavy federal court
caseloads, the possibility of magistrates trying felony criminal cases
with the consent of the parties has even been floated within judicial
administrative bodies.3
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law; B.A. Yale
University; J.D. University of Chicago Law School. This Article is a more detailed version
of a speech I gave at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Big Sky, Montana in July 2001. I want to express my gratitude to
Professors Tom Rowe, Jeff Renz and Tom Huff for their advice and input, to Stacey
Gordon for her assistance in finding research materials, and to Michael Headley for his
diligent editing. Thanks also to United States Magistrate Judges Bart Erickson and
Virginia Mathis for facilitating my involvement with this project. Finally, this project was
made possible in part by financial assistance from the University of Montana Foundation.
1. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928-29 n.5 (1991) (citing Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305,308 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989)).
2. Two commentators point out that as a result of the 1990 amendments to the civil
consent provisions in 28 U.S.C. section 636(c), "the number of trials presided over by
magistrate judges increased over 70% from 1019 to 1743 between 1989 and 1994." Philip
M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of
the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (1995).
3. Comm. on the Admin. of the Magistrate Judges Sys., Supplement to the Long
Range Plan for the Magistrate Judges System (1994) (on file with author). This idea has
not been adopted or implemented so far.
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What then distinguishes the core powers of federal district court
judges and federal magistrate judges? When Justice Anthony
Kennedy served on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, he
suggested that district judges alone have the power to hold parties in
contempt under Article III of the Constitution.4 Yet, the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 2000 (FCIA) has given magistrate judges
limited contempt powers for the first time.5 Previously, magistrate
judges could only certify contempt findings for later district judge
rulings.6  The FCIA raises profound constitutional questions
regarding the meaning of Article III, which establishes the federal
judicial power.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that the
contempt authority is a "potent weapon" that can be "deadly" if
misapplied.8 This statutory provision also raises the issue of whether
magistrates can avoid constitutional problems by how they implement
this new power. This Article examines the constitutionality of
magistrate contempt powers, and these related implementation
questions.
Interestingly, the recent grant of magistrate contempt powers
shows history repeating itself. In 1967, Congress proposed abolishing
the U.S. Commissioner system and replacing it with a system of
magistrates. Congress considered giving these magistrates "the
power to try and punish contempts." 9 Eventually the Federal
Magistrate's Act of 1968 was passed but without that language. Why
was that language deleted? A Committee of the U.S. Judicial
Conference expressed "serious doubts" about the contempt provision,
but said little more.0 As a result of these doubts, Congress only gave
magistrates the power to make recommendations regarding contempt
to district court judges.
Thirty years later, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1997
also proposed granting limited contempt power to magistrate judges.
4. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545
(9th Cir. 1984).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (2000).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1994) (amended 2000).
7. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
8. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
Other courts have said that contempt authority is an "awesome power" of the judiciary.
See e.g., In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827 F.2d 1281, 1285 (9th Cir. 1987). The
Supreme Court has also said that Congress can't exhaustively define contemptuous
conduct because contempt power "is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary
has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other
Branches." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,796 (1987).
9. Proctor v. North Carolina, 830 F.2d 514, 518-19 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting from
the U.S. Senate Committee Report on the Federal Magistrate's Act of 1968, regarding
how district judges should review magistrate contempt certifications).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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Despite not opposing the legislation, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) informed a House Subcommittee that "giving contempt power
to non-Article III judges raises some constitutional concerns."'"
Unfortunately, as with the 1967 Judicial Conference Committee
Report, the DOJ did not provide the subcommittee with a thorough
legal analysis or reach a definite view about these constitutional
concerns. The only difference between the two reports was that
"serious doubts" were replaced thirty years later by "constitutional
concerns." As the great American philosopher, and former New
York Yankees catcher, Yogi Berra once said: "it's deja vu all over
again."'"
There may, however, be something to the judicious avoidance in
these approaches because, as Supreme Court Justice Byron White has
said, the question of Article IIl judicial power is "one of the most
confusing and controversial areas of constitutional law."13
Nonetheless, this Article asserts that the Supreme Court would likely
find unconstitutional the FCIA summary contempt section which
allows magistrates immediately to jail, for a limited period,
individuals who are obstructive in court. This summary contempt
section violates separation of powers principles and Article III
because the magistrate effectively serves as both the prosecutor and
the judge at the same time, without the accused's consent, and the
accused isn't even allowed a lawyer's representation before being
jailed.14 The limited penalties available to the magistrate judge, and
appellate review, do not make up for these flaws. Magistrates in such
cases should employ other means, besides contempt, to encourage
recalcitrant parties to behave, including the use of sanctions, though
issues arise there too regarding a magistrate's authority.
11. H.R. REP. No. 105-437, at 22 (1998) (emphasis added) (quoting letter from
Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department
of Justice, to the Honorable Howard Coble, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives).
12. See William D. Araiza et al., The Jursiprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697,
714 (Spring 1997).
13. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2) (2000). This section allows magistrates to use summary
criminal contempt power against people who engage in "misbehavior... in the magistrate
judge's presence so as to obstruct the administration of justice." The difference between
criminal and civil contempt powers is discussed later in the text.
15. The Ninth Circuit has approved of magistrates having the authority to impose
certain kinds of discovery sanctions related to pretrial proceedings. Grimes v. City &
County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991). But some courts have not
allowed magistrates to rule on post-dismissal sanction motions. See e.g., Massey v. City of
Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1993).
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This Article also asserts, however, that the Supreme Court would
uphold the FCIA's other criminal and civil contempt powers (besides
summary criminal contempt) because these powers can mainly only
be used in cases where the parties have consented to magistrate judge
jurisdiction, and because greater procedural protections will normally
be afforded the defendant in such instances. r6 Moreover, this Article
recommends that district courts alter their magistrate consent forms
to acknowledge explicitly that magistrates have these new contempt
powers. Such revisions will make it harder for unhappy litigants to
challenge the magistrate's use of the powers.
Part I of this Article describes the FCIA's provisions in detail
and its legislative history. It also explains the difference between civil
and criminal contempt. Part II discusses the leading court decisions
regarding Article III and magistrate powers. Part III then
demonstrates why the Supreme Court would likely find the summary
criminal contempt provision unconstitutional, while upholding the
other parts. Part III also questions the Supreme Court's emphasis on
consent as the key to magistrate power, and reflects on the
problematic implications of the Court's approach for Article III and
the federal court system.
I. The FCIA Contempt Provisions And Their Legislative
History
A. The FCIA
The Supreme Court has described the difference between civil
and criminal contempt orders as "somewhat elusive." 7 This is an
understatement. In theory, civil contempt orders are supposed to be
remedial, designed to cause the disobedient party to comply -with
court directives. Thus the party can purge herself of the contempt.'
For example, an order requiring a defendant to pay a monetary fine
every day until the defendant complies with an earlier court directive
would likely be viewed as a civil contempt order. By contrast,
16. It should be noted that magistrates can hear petty misdemeanor cases without the
defendant's consent, 18 U.S.C. § 3401, and can use this non-summary contempt power in
such cases. Given the significant procedural protections present in the non-summary
contempt situation, and the trivial penalties involved, this probably would be found
constitutional by the Supreme Court. An example of these procedural protections is
found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). The contrast with the summary
contempt provision's absence of explicit procedural protections in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 42(a) is striking.
17. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 830 (1994). The Court
there elaborated that, "[niumerous scholars have criticized as unworkable the traditional
distinction between civil and criminal contempt." Id. at 827 n.3.
18. Id at 827-28.
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criminal contempt orders are punitive and designed to vindicate the
court's authority.1 9
A typical criminal contempt fine will be paid in a lump sum to
the court clerk's office. A civil contempt fine may be paid to the
opposing party to remedy unnecessary costs caused by the
contumacious conduct.'o Another difference is that criminal
contempt proceedings are considered to be separate from the main
case. In effect, the court vindicates the public interest against the
defendant. Civil contempt, by contrast, is part of the original case."
Congress has established several contempt options for
magistrates in the FCIA. First, a magistrate can exercise "summary
criminal contempt authority" over persons who engage in such
"misbehavior... in the magistrate judge's presence so as to obstruct
the administration of justice."'  This typically covers obstructive
actions in court that the magistrate witnesses. Fines or imprisonment
are possible penalties. Use of the term "summary" refers to the
abbreviated procedures.' Usually the judge acts as the prosecutor,
and the lawyer must defend herself on the spot with no real advance
notice. This provision therefore permits magistrates to hold parties in
contempt even where the parties have not actually signed written
consent forms to the magistrate's jurisdiction.
Next, the statute provides that magistrates can exercise
additional (non-summary) civil and criminal contempt powers in civil
cases, and certain misdemeanor criminal cases, where the parties have
provided the required consent. These contempt proceedings will
usually be held only after the attorney receives notice and a chance to
obtain legal assistance. Moreover, the judge will usually appoint a
separate prosecutor in non-summary criminal contempt matters. This
consent to having a magistrate preside over these cases, however, can
only be obtained under procedures which "protect the voluntariness"
of the consent and which inform the parties that no "adverse
consequences" will result if they insist instead on having a district
19. Id at 828.
20. Id at 829.
21. Belinda K. Orem, The Impenitent Contemnor: The Power of the Bankruptcy Courts
to Imprison, 25 CAL. BANKR. J. 222,239 (2000).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2) (2000). The term "summary contempt" is discussed at length
in Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 898 n.l1, 899-901, 904 n.25 (3d
Cir. 1992).
23. Taberer, 954 F.2d at 898 n.l, 899-901,904 n.25.
24. A magistrate's authority to preside over civil cases with the parties' consent is
found at 28 U.S.C. section 636(c). Authority for a magistrate to preside over certain
misdemeanor criminal cases is established at 18 U.S.C. section 3401. In the criminal
misdemeanor context, there is actually a presumption of consent built into that statute
unless the party opts out, whereas actual affirmative consent is needed in civil cases.
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judge preside.' Finally, the FCIA allows magistrates to use the
contempt power without consent in certain petty misdemeanor
cases.
26
The FCIA also tries to preserve the distinction between the full
contempt power of Article III judges versus this new contempt power
for magistrate judges by limiting the penalties that magistrates can
impose mainly to misdemeanor-level fines.27 By contrast, where the
magistrate believes a "serious criminal contempt" has taken place
requiring a heavier penalty, the magistrate still must certify the matter
for the district court's examination, as under the previous version of
the statute!' Magistrate summary criminal contempt orders are
appealable to the district court. The court of appeals alone, however,
reviews magistrate contempt rulings in consent cases. The FCIA does
not specify appellate review standards.
B. Legislative History and Other Background
The importance and powers of magistrates have grown since the
Federal Magistrates Act took effect in 1968, replacing the U.S.
Commissioner system." The FCIA contempt statute is just another
example of that growth. The Supreme Court has even quoted
approvingly from a federal appellate court decision saying that, "[i]t
can hardly be denied that the system created by the Federal
Magistrates Act has exceeded the highest expectations of the
legislators who conceived it."30
The 1979 Magistrate's Act amendments contributed to this
increased growth by authorizing magistrates to preside over civil
cases and certain misdemeanor criminal cases when the parties
consent31 Supporters said this was constitutional because consent
equals a waiver of any procedural objections, and because
magistrates are court adjuncts subject to Article III supervision and
appellate review. 2 In 1990, Congress officially designated magistrates
as magistrate judges thus enhancing their Article III stature.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (2000).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(5) (2000).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6) (2000).
29. A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 251-52
(1993) [hereinafter Study]. This was an especially significant study done by the Magistrate
Judge Committee of the Judicial Conference.
30. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 n.5 (1991) (citing Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305,308 (3d Cir. 1989)).
31. J. Anthony Downs, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of Final
Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1032, 1032-33 (1985)
(referencing the "enlarged power of magistrates").
32. Study, supra note 29, at 304.
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Despite this growth, the magistrate judge system is like a house
of cards because the Supreme Court has not resolved the
constitutionality of its basic components. For example, the Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of the consent trial provisions,
though all federal appellate courts to address the question have
upheld them."
As mentioned earlier, the Senate considered the matter of
whether these new magistrates should have contempt powers in 1967.
The Senate rewrote some proposed legislation which "would have
permitted the U.S. magistrate himself to punish such acts when
committed in his presence as contempts of court."'  Congress instead
adopted the certification approach, based on bankruptcy law." The
Senate Report justified this change, saying that, "[tihe Committee on
the Administration of Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the
United States expressed 'serious doubts' about the present
provisions... as presently worded which would give a full-time or
part-time magistrate the power to try and punish contempts. 36
The issue of whether magistrates should have any contempt
authority resurfaced in a 1981 Report by the United States Judicial
Conference to Congress." As two commentators explain, "Although
the Conference made no recommendation on contempt, it suggested
that Congress explore the need for such authority for magistrates in
appropriate circumstances."3" In a June 1989 report to the Federal
Courts Study Committee, the Magistrate Judges Committee of the
Judicial Conference took the view that magistrates should be granted
limited contempt powers. 9 The Federal Courts Study Committee did
not include the contempt recommendation in its April 1990 report,
though it did suggest carrying out a study on the constitutional limits
of magistrate authority."
In 1991, the Magistrate Judge's Committee finished this
Constitutional Study which was eventually published in the 1993
33. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3071.1, at 396 (2d ed. 1997) ("Thus there is at least a serious potential problem of squaring
section 636(c) with Article III.... The Supreme Court has not directly addressed section
636(c)... [but] [t]he lower courts have, with near unanimity, held that section 636(c) is
constitutional.") (footnotes omitted).
34. Proctor v. North Carolina, 830 F.2d 514, 518 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting
extensively from the U.S. Senate Committee Report on the Federal Magistrate's Act of
1968).
35. Id. at 519-20.
36. Id. at 518-19 (emphasis added). See also Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
954 F.2d 888, 904 (3d Cir. 1992).
37. Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 2, at 1513.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1517; Study, supra note 29, at 306.
40. Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 2.
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Federal Rules of Decision volumes.4' The Study concluded that
magistrates should not try felony cases because of constitutional
problems. 2 On the contempt matter, however, the Magistrate Judges
Committee in June 1992 "voted to reaffirm in principle its June 1989
view that a need exists to provide magistrate judges with summary
contempt power, but the Committee declined to seek specific
legislation." 
43
In June 1994, an amended Long Range Plan for the Magistrate
Judges System was developed by the Magistrate Judges Committee
which proposed that magistrate udges "be accorded power to punish
litigants directly for contempt." In March of 1995, the Committee
on Long Range Planning of the United States Judicial Conference
issued its Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts. This
Plan recommended "limited contempt authority for magistrate
judges .... 45
Efforts to turn this recommendation into legislation began with
H.R. 2294, the Federal Court Improvements Act of 1997. In October
of 1997, Judge Philip Pro (then Chair of the Judicial Conference's
Committee on Magistrate Judges), Magistrate Judge Tommy Miller
(then President of the Federal Magistrate Judges Association), and
others testified in favor of this legislation and its provision granting
limited contempt powers to magistrate judges. They testified before
the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, Committee of the Judiciary. 6
41. Id. at 1523; Study, supra note 29, at 247.
42. Study, supra note 29, at 306:
The Magistrate Judges Committee endorses the position that judicial duties in
certain critical stages of felony cases, including accepting guilty pleas, conducting
sentencing proceedings, and presiding over the trial of a felony case, are
fundamental elements of the authority of Article III judges and thus are not
appropriate for delegation to magistrate judges, regardless of whether or not the
defendant consents to the involvement of the magistrate judge.
But a 1994 Supplement to a Long Range Study of the Role of Magistrates, supra note
3, forecasts that growing caseloads mean that magistrates may be needed to preside over
felony proceedings with the consent of the parties. The Judicial Conference has not
apparently endorsed this Supplement. According to Douglas Lee, drafter of the new
contempt provisions, the friendlier attitude towards having magistrates handle felony
proceedings in the 1994 Supplement was partly a result of a change in Magistrate
Committee composition. Telephone Interview with Douglas Lee, Attorney for the
Magistrate Section of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (June 26,2001).
43. Study, supra note 29, at 306.
44. Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 2.
45. Id. at 1534-35.
46. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 2294 Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. at 1997 WL 626944
(F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Judge Philip M. Pro, Chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Magistrate Judges); The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1997: Hearing
on H.R. 2294 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong.
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Though not opposing the legislation, the Department of Justice
sent a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee, authored by
Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois, referencing several federal
court decisions and suggesting that "giving contempt power to non-
Article III judges raises some constitutional concerns."47 Judge Pro,
however, obtained a detailed constitutional analysis, rebutting the
DOJ concerns, from Douglas A. Lee, attorney for the Magistrate
Judge's Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on
October 29, 1997.4s Despite this support, Congress in 1997 failed to
enact these contempt provisions.
On March 18, 1998, the full House of Representatives debated
the successor Federal Court Improvements Act of 1998 and
eventually passed the bill, though it also failed to become law.
Congressman Manzullo made a passionate statement opposing the
bill's contempt provision based both on substantive constitutional
grounds and on a bad experience in his legislative district involving a
magistrate that he believed unjustly "took control" of a local school
district.49 Otherwise Congressional opposition was absent.
Congress was subsequently faced with the Federal Court
Improvements Act of 1999 which was supported by testimony from
Federal Judge Harvey Schlesinger (who had Judge Pro's position)
and Magistrate Judge Joel Rosen (who had Magistrate Judge Miller's
position)." This version was not enacted into law either. Finally the
Federal Court Improvements Act of 2000 became law. Magistrate
Judge Robert B. Collings, Legislative Chair of the Federal Magistrate
Judges Association, compiled documentation that was submitted to
Congress to help with the successful lobbying efforts in 2000." Thus,
almost 35 years after the idea surfaced, magistrates had the contempt
authority.
at 1997 WL 621873 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Judge Tommy Miller, President, Federal
Magistrate Judges Association).
47. Memorandum from Administrative Office of the United States Courts Supporting
Expanded Contempt Authority for United States Magistrate Judges by Douglas A. Lee of
the Magistrate Judges Division (Oct. 29, 1997) (attached to materials sent to author by
Magistrate Judge Collings).
48. Id.
49. 144 Cong. Rec. H1247 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1998) (statement of Rep. Manzullo),
LEXIS 144 Cong Rec H1247p*1254.
50. H.R. 1752 Addresses Needs of Federal Court System, THE THIRD BRANCH (July
1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jul99ttblhr1752.html.
51. Letter from Robert B. Collings, Chief United States Magistrate Judge, United
States District Court of Massachusetts, to Mark Kende, Professor, University of Montana
Law School (June 7,2001) (on file with author).
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U. The Relevant Case Law And Constitutional Principles
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of
magistrate contempt authority though several pre-FCIA federal
appellate court cases have touched on the question. Article III,
section 1 of the Constitution specifies that:
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
The keys to the federal judiciary's independence are the good
behavior and compensation clauses. The good behavior clause
means that federal judges have life tenure absent impeachment.
Federal judges are appointed by the President and must be confirmed
by a majority of the Senate. The compensation clause ensures that
neither Congress nor the President can reduce judicial salaries even if
they do not like certain judicial decisions."
Why are independent federal judges an important part of the
American constitutional scheme? Several different justifications exist
but the most fundamental is separation of powers. This principle lies
behind the federal government's three distinct branches of
government, each of which acts as a check and balance against the
other branches. 4  These checks and balances preclude the
development of a tyrannical monolithic government. The judiciary
must be independent to check the other branches effectively.
Magistrate judges differ from Article III judges because they lack
life tenure, lack constitutional protection from salary reductions,' and
are not selected at the national level by a presidential appointment
with Senate confirmation. They are selected by the Article III judges
in their districts and serve eight-year terms. Article III judges can
remove magistrates for reasons other than impeachable behavior,
such as poor work performance. Thus, magistrates lack the
independence of Article III judges. Some commentators and courts
have said this raises concerns about impartiality and the possibility of
magistrates being influenced by the Article III judges who run their
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 (6th ed. 1997).
53. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 35. See also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,58-59 (1982).
54. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 145.
55. There is, however, a federal statute that protects magistrates from salary
diminution. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1994). Of course, that statute could be amended or
repealed at any time unlike a constitutional protection.
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courts. For example, a chief district judge determined to lower
docket numbers could impress that priority on magistrates. 6
But where does the contempt power fit into this analysis?
Article III judges are considered to have "inherent contempt
power[s]" because that is one of the keys to the enforcability of their
decisions." An inability to enforce the judgments would render the
judicial branch toothless in the separation of powers scheme.
Magistrates lack such inherent power. The question then is how
much of the federal judicial power, designed originally for Article III
judges, can be delegated to these non-Article III adjunct courts.
Several key cases require examination.
A. Supreme Court Cases
(1) Raddatz
The Supreme Court first visited the issue of the constitutional
implications of magistrate powers in a 1980 felony criminal case,
United States v. Raddatz.ss The Court ruled that it was constitutional
for the Federal Magistrates Act to permit "a district court to refer to
a magistrate a motion to suppress evidence and [to] authorize[] the
district court to determine and decide such motion based on the
record developed before a magistrate, including the magistrate's
proposed findings of fact and recommendations."59  The Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which
had held that defendants in a suppression hearing were deprived of
"due process by the failure of the District Court personally to hear
the controverted testimony" since "credibility is crucial to the
outcome."6"
The Court reasoned that the defendant's due process rights were
not violated, nor was Article III infringed upon, because the district
court judge acted as the ultimate decisionmaker and was free to
accept, reject or modify the magistrate's findings. The district judge
even could have heard testimony. Congress correctly concluded that
"permitting the exercise of an adjudicatory function by a magistrate,
subject to ultimate review by the district court, would pass
constitutional muster."6
56. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc. 725 F.2d 537, 549-54
(9th Cir. 1984) (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
57. In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827 F.2d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1987).
Enforceability also turns on executive branch compliance with the Court's more
controversial judgments. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
58. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
59. Id at 669.
60. Id. at 672-73.
61. Id. at 681 n.8.
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Justice Blackmun authored an important concurrence in which
he said that any constitutional concern was diminished by the district
court's affirmance of the magistrate which meant that the defendant
received two bites at the apple and lost both times. The defendant
hardly lacked sufficient process.62 He said that the focus should be on
a "practical concern for accurate results."' Justice Blackmun also
said that in light of these two bites, "I simply do not perceive the
threat to the judicial power or the independence of judicial
decisionmaking that underlies Article III. ' '64 Justice Blackmun's
approach heralds the origins of a pragmatic approach to Article III.
Justice Marshall countered in dissent that the district judge must
make first-hand credibility determinations under Article III given the
important liberty interests at stake in such a criminal case.65
(2) Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
Two years later, the Supreme Court, in a plurality decision in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
found that it was an unconstitutional Article III violation for a United
States Bankruptcy Court to handle related state law claims. Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion and Justice White's dissent were
important because they revealed a basic dichotomy over Article 111.67
Justice Brennan said that the Bankruptcy Act "impermissibly
removed most, if not all, of the 'essential attributes of the judicial
power' from the Article III district court, and has vested those
attributes in a non-Article III adjunct."" In other words, Justice
Brennan believed that Article III requires certain matters be resolved
only by Article III judges because they go to the core of federal
62. Id. at 684-85 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 684 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 694 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
67. Justice Brennan also discussed at length whether the new bankruptcy courts could
be justified as Article I courts, carrying out constitutional powers bestowed upon the non-
judicial branches, as opposed to adjunct Article III courts. He said there were only "three
narrow situations ... in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive
Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional
assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than
threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers." Id. at 64. These
situations were territorial courts, military courts, and public rights matters heard by
legislative courts and administrative agencies. Id. at 64-70. Justice White said that Justice
Brennan's "pigeonholing" does "violence" to the meaning of the cases and "creates an
artificial structure that itself lacks coherence." Id. at 94.
68. Id. at 87. Cf Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 453 (1929) (Article I courts
may not consider any matter "which inherently or necessarily requires judicial
determination," but only such matters as are "susceptible of legislative or executive
determination.").
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judicial power.69 This has been described as the "essential attributes"
approach."
Justice White disagreed and advocated a more flexible pragmatic
approach. He wrote that "[w]hether an issue can be decided by a
non-Art. III court does not depend upon the judicial or non-judicial
character of the issue, but on the will of Congress and the reasons
Congress offers for not using an Art. III court."" He noted that the
Court had been pragmatic in rejecting any overarching formal
principles in addressing the constitutionality of the Article I
administrative agency courts that have long adjudicated common law
issues.' Justice White referred to Justice Harlan, for example, who
said that, "Whether constitutional limitations on the exercise of
judicial power have been held inapplicable has depended on the
particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives."73
But what test did Justice White advocate to implement this
pragmatic focus? He said that:
Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should
be read as expressing one value that must be balanced against
competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.
This Court retains the final word on how that balance is to be
struck.
I do not suggest that the Court should simply look to the strength
of the legislative interest and ask itself if that interest is more
compelling than the values furthered by Art. III. The inquiry
should, rather, focus equally on those Art. III values and ask
whether and to what extent the legislative scheme accommodates
them or, conversely, substantially undermines them.74
Admittedly, Justice White's focus in this bankruptcy court case
had more to do with what powers could be granted to Article I
legislative or agency courts, and not adjunct Article III courts which
69. Justice Brennan said that "[m]any of the rights subject to adjudication by the Act's
bankruptcy courts ... are not of Congress' creation... [such as Northern's claim for
breach of contract damages].... Accordingly, Congress' authority to control the manner
in which that right is adjudicated, through assignment of historically judicial functions to a
non-Art. III 'adjunct,' plainly must be deemed at a minimum." Northern Pipeline, 450
U.S. at 84 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Daniel E. Hinde, Note, Consensual Sentencing in the Magistrate Court, 75 TEX L.
REv. 1161, 1168 (1997). Justice Brennan, however, did not obtain a majority to go along
with this particular legal principle given that Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred
on narrower grounds. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 89.
71. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 108 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 112 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530
(1962)).
74. Id. at 113, 115 (White, J., dissenting).
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are the issue with magistrates. But the basic idea of assessing the
validity of delegating judicial powers, by balancing the import of the
congressional purpose against the burden on fully independent
Article III judges, certainly can be applied in the magistrate context.
He then elaborated that appellate review of Article I court decisions
goes "a long way toward insuring a proper separation of powers."75
Justice White's 6ragmatic balancing of interests has been called the
due process test.
(3) CFTC v. Schor
Contrary to Northern Pipeline, Justice White's pragmatic due
process approach won out over Justice Brennan's "essential
attributes" view in the Supreme Court's 1986 decision, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.77 In Schor, the Supreme Court
found that Article III was not violated when Congress delegated to
the CFTC administrative law judges (ALJs) the power to resolve
state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings. Unlike
magistrates, ALJs are generally considered part of the executive
branch because they are usually selected by the federal agency for
which they serve. Nonetheless, the issue of whether ALJs are
unconstitutionally carrying out Article III judicial duties is very
similar to the question of the permissible authority that can be
granted to magistrates as adjuncts to Article III judges.
The CFTC is charged with implementing the Commodities
Exchange Act which "broadly prohibits fraudulent and manipulative
conduct in connection with commodity futures transactions."7S The
Court initially pointed out that statutes should, where possible, be
construed to avoid constitutional problems.79  The Court then
emphasized that Article III could not be interpreted by "conclusory
reference[s]" to its text but instead must be examined with its
underlying purposes in mind.' The Court elaborated by explaining
75. Id. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
76. Hinde, supra note 70, at 1171. This name is appropriate as the Supreme Court has
said that evaluating whether a procedural due process violation has occurred, when
someone is deprived of life, liberty, or property, involves balancing several factors: the
burden on the person injured; the weight of the governmental interest; and the risk of
error without a more thorough process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Classic
procedural due process requirements include notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). These are certainly relevant issues in the
contempt context where someone's liberty can be in jeopardy.
77. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
78. Id. at 836.
79. Id. at 841.
80. Id. at 847.
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that a pragmatic interpretation was required, not a doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories as in the Brennan approach."'
The Court then stated that the separation of powers concerns
involving Article III have two aspects, a personal and structural one.
Separation of powers promotes individual personal concerns because
it safeguards a litigant's "right to have claims decided before judges
who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government." But the Court elaborated that the personal aspect
does not "confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary
consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court" and
that, as a personal right, the riht is waivable "just as are other
personal constitutional rights." Indeed the Court referenced
Northern Pipeline to illustrate how the absence of consent there was
important to the result.' The Court subsequently found that Schor
had waived any objection to the CFTC tribunal given his activities
before that agency." The Court further said that personal interests
were the "primary" focus of separation powers, rather than structural
interests.86
According to Schor, the structural interests underlying the
separation of powers doctrine only bar congressional efforts to
transfer jurisdiction to non-Article III courts where the transfers
might "emasculate" constitutional courts. 7 Separation of powers is
designed to prevent "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other."" These kinds of dramatic
structural concerns cannot be cured by consent because typically
subject matter jurisdiction and other institutional interests are at
stake.69
81. Id. at 848, 857. Schor's pragmatism follows Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), another pragmatic decision in the Article III area.
82- Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,218 (1980)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 849 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
80 n.31 (1982)) (Justice Brennan says the old bankruptcy referee system required consent
of the parties unlike the relatively independent new Bankruptcy Courts). Yet given
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the structural violation caused by having non-Article III
courts decide these matters, the absence of consent would not seem to be very central to
his analysis.
85. Id-
86. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 850.
88. Id. at 850 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam)).
89. Id. at 851. There is an interesting issue as to whether granting magistrates
contempt power raises subject matter jurisdiction questions or not. But the
constitutionality of the FCIA can be addressed without definitively resolving that matter.
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The Court in Schor then elaborated on some pragmatic factors to
be considered in determining whether Congress has infringed
impermissibly upon the Article III courts:
Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent to
which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to
Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-
Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.Y
These factors reflect mainly Justice White's pragmatic concerns,
though Justice Brennan's essential attributes test acts as a starting
point.
In Schor, the Court applied these factors and said that the law
did not intrude on Article III impermissibly because the CFTC could
only hear one kind of common law counterclaim. The Court said
such a "single deviation" from the agency model "leaves far more of
the essential attributes of judicial power to Article III courts than did
the... Bankruptcy Act" at issue in Northern Pipeline.9 The Court
said that it did not want to reject CFTC jurisdiction "out of fear of
where some hypothetical slippery slope may deposit us."'
The Court further looked at what role consent should play in the
Article III analysis where both personal and structural separation of
power concerns are triggered. Does the presence of even some
structural concerns mean consent is irrelevant? Or does the personal
concern automatically mean consent is crucial since the personal
concern is "primary" over the structural one? The Court said the
presence of consent "diminishes," without eliminating, the separation
of powers concerns.' The Court elaborated:
[C]ongress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism through
which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their
differences. This is not to say, of course, that if Congress created a
phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire
business of the Article III courts without any Article III supervision
or control and without evidence of valid and specific legislative
necessities, the fact that the parties had the election to proceed in
their forum of choice would necessarily save the scheme from
constitutional attack .... But this case obviously bears no
resemblance to such a scenario, given the degree of judicial control
saved to the federal courts.., as well as the congressional purpose
90. Id.
91. Id. at 852.
92. Id. The Court even explicitly said it seeks to apply a "pragmatic understanding" of
congressional delegations and Article III.. Id. at 853.
93. Id. at 855.
[Vol. 53
behind the jurisdictional delegation, the demonstrated need for the
delegation, and the limited nature of the delegation.94
In other words, consent generally justifies non-Article III judge
powers unless the legal framework virtually eliminates the business of
Article II judges. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy and Seventh Circuit
Judge Richard Posner have both expressed constitutional concerns
about the diminishing status of Article III judges given the "growing
importance of magistrate judges."9
Not suprisingly, given his essential attributes approach, Justice
Brennan criticized the Schor majority for eroding Article III.96 He
quoted the Federalist Papers to the effect that an independent
judiciary "certainly [can]not be expected from Judges who hold their
offices by a temporary commission." Justice Brennan further says
the fact that Congress only delegated one common law issue to the
non-Article III CFTC judges did not mean there was no dilution of
Article 11.9 He then made two other pointed criticisms.
Regarding pragmatic balancing, he said that courts inevitably
place too high a premium on the legislative interest asserted for the
intrusion, which is usually "immediate, concrete and easily
understood against [the Article III concerns], the benefits of which are
almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not
worth the cost in any single case." ' In other words, the balancing is
"weighted against judicial independence" and "[t]he danger of the
Court's balancing approach is, of course, that as individual cases
accumulate in which the Court finds that the short-term benefits of
efficiency outweigh the long-term benefits of judicial independence,
the protections of Article III will be eviscerated."'0 ' Moreover, he
said that the structural and personal concerns underlying separation
of powers are "inseparable" and that "consent is irrelevant to Article
III analysis" given the presence of important structural concerns. 101
(4) Peretz
The most recent relevant Supreme Court case involving
magistrate powers is Peretz v. United States,'O° where the Court
94. IL
95. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at 399 (1997). See also infra Section II.B.1.
96. 478 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. 1& at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)). It is interesting to see the liberal Justice Brennan making an originalist-type
argument.
98. Id. at 865-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan is concerned in part that non-
Article II judges are less likely to be impartial and free of political influences.
102. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
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addressed the circumstances in which magistrates can handle
significant, i.e. non-subsidiary, matters. The specific issue was
whether a magistrate could conduct voir dire in a felony criminal case
with the consent of the parties, though the Federal Magistrate's Act
did not expressly grant the power. Numerous commentators,
including the previously referenced Magistrate Judge's Committee's
Constitutional Study, had said that magistrates could not handle
felony case matters. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the
magistrate's role was permissible given party consent and given the
district judge's supervision."°
The Peretz Court said that a party's consent was necessary before
a magistrate could perform a delegated function that was not a
"subsidiary matter."" The Court then said that felony voir dire
matters were not subsidiary,' but that consent could overcome that
because "litigants may waive their personal right to have an Article
III judge preside over a civil trial." '  The Court once again used a
pragmatic approach, explaining that "Congress intended to give
federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible
improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process that had not
already been tried or even foreseen. "' Another reason for the
Court's efficiency emphasis may have been the Civil Justice Reform
Act, which became law in 1990 and whose purpose was to improve
efficiency by allowing district court experimentation.'"
The Peretz Court also said that "[e]ven assuming that a litigant
may not waive structural protections provided by Article III... no
such structural protections are implicated by the procedure followed
in this case. Magistrates are appointed and subject to removal by
Article III judges."'10 The Court said that:
We do not face a procedure under which Congress [has] delegate[d]
to a non-Art. III judge the authority to make final determinations
on issues of fact... Rather we confront a procedure under which
Congress has vested in Article III judges the discretionary power to
delegate certain functions to competent and impartial assistants,
103. Study, supra note 29, at 306.
104. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 923. The Court's ruling was a kind of modification of its
decision in Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), holding that a magistrate could
not conduct voir dire in the absence of consent and de novo district court review. Gomez,
however, was a statutory interpretation case so no constitutional reasoning there
precluded the Court's holding in Peretz.
105. 501 U.S. at 932.
106. Id. at 933.
107. Id. at 936.
108. Id. at 932.
109. SHREVE & HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 311 (2d ed. 1994);
Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 143-44 (1993).
110. 501 U.S. at 937.
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while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control
over the assistants' activities."'
Thus, the latest Supreme Court decision endorses the increasing role
played by magistrates in the federal court system, particularly where
consent is present.
(5) The Resulting Legal Framework
The first principle in the Supreme Court cases and related
commentary seems to be that magistrates cannot conduct felony
criminal trials, though explanations as to why not have been
conclusory, as in the Magistrate's Constitutional Study referenced
earlier. But this shows that Justice Brennan's essential attributes test
has some life.
Second, Peretz says that there are certain subsidiary matters that
judges can refer to magistrates without consent. These include petty
offenses and non-disposative discovery disputes.
Third, Peretz shows that magistrates can generally hear the
middle category of matters (those not essential to Article III, nor
merely subsidiary) in consent cases. Consent, though, is a necessary
but not sufficient condition. The pragmatic balancing factors listed in
the Schor case must also be analyzed in these middle cases to
determine whether the congressional justification for granting power
to the magistrate outweighs the intrusion on Article III values. But,
as Schor demonstrated, this balancing customarily favors upholding
the non-Article III judge powers where consent is present.
Fourth, it appears that magistrates generally cannot hear the
middle category of issues absent consent. The Court's views on this
question are the most difficult to assess, however, because so few
cases like this have arisen. But the Supreme Court seems to
emphasize that consent in the magistrate context is crucial.
B. Federal Appellate Court Cases
Virtually every federal appellate court to have addressed the
magistrate consent trial provisions has found them to be
constitutional . Among the most important are the Ninth Circuit's
decision, written by then Judge Anthony Kennedy, in Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix" and the Seventh
111. Id. at 938-39.
112. One commentator specifically advocates such a practical balancing approach.
Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed of Judicial
Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253,290 (1991).
113. Proctor v. North Carolina, 830 F.2d 514,518 (4th Cir. 1987).
114. 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984).
March 2002] NEW CONTEMPT POWERS
Circuit decision in Geras v. LaFayette Display Fixtures, Inc.,"' which
includes a powerful Judge Posner dissent. Pacemaker upheld the
consent trial provision's constitutionality in a case where a magistrate
found that the plaintiff had a valid patent that was not infringed.
Geras involved negligence, warranty, and tort claims. These opinions
provide a foundation for looking at the constitutionality of magistrate
contempt powers and usually mention the issue. Another Ninth
Circuit case, Bingman v. Ward,"6 specifically addressed whether
magistrates have any inherent contempt powers.
(1) The Magistrate Consent Trial Provision
The main reason why courts have upheld magistrate trials is
because the parties consented and because nothing as significant as a
felony criminal trial was occurring. The Seventh Circuit in Geras had
a particularly instructive discussion of the consent question. Consent
meant that the parties could have had trials in front of Article III
judges in reasonable circumstances, but freely chose not to do so.
The Seventh Circuit rejected arguments that some degree of coercion
was inevitable when cases end up being tried by magistrates."7
Regarding the separation of power concerns, the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits emphasized that the federal district courts still retained
their core powers. Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he standard for
determining whether there is an improper interference with or
delegation of the independent power of a branch is whether the
alteration prevents or substantially impairs performance by the
branch of its essential role in the constitutional system.""8 He added
that the separation of powers issue under the magistrate statute was a
bit unique because "[t]he potential for disruption is instead the
erosion of the central powers of the judiciary by permitting it to
delegate its own authority. '"9
Justice Kennedy concluded, however, that no unacceptable
intrusion into the judicial branch took place because the Article III
judges retained virtually complete supervisory control over the
magistrate system. In addition, he said that "Article Inl authority is
preserved in other respects. District courts retain the power to
115. 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984).
116. 100 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1996).
117. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1042. The Seventh Circuit said that such assumptions about
coercion by the Article III judge were "almost entirely speculative; there is no hard
evidence of economic, or other systemic, coercion." Id. But the court added that, "[a]s we
have said, a radical shift to trial by magistrate could easily result in a finding of
unconstitutionality on the new facts." Id- at 1045.
118. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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adjudge a party in contempt."' ' In other words, the contempt
authority is a crucial part of Article III power.
The Seventh Circuit likewise dismissed concerns over the fact
that magistrates were required to make findings and were allowed to
enter the actual judgments in these cases. The court said that
"[u]nlike the relatively mechanical entry of judgment [by
magistrates], the power to punish for contempt of court is the means
by which many court judgments, not including the collection of
money judgments, are enforced..' 2' The Department of Justice letters
from Mr. Fois to Congress questioning the FCIA, referenced earlier,
relied on this Geras language to suggest that magistrate contempt
power violates Article III.
Justice Kennedy further explained that the magistrate system is
consistent with the "Appointments and Removal Clause" in Article
II, section 2 because that section allows courts of law to appoint
inferior officers such as magistrates."z He also described compelling
policy reasons for the creation of an infrastructure:
for determining certain civil cases with the consent of the parties
and subject to judicial control. Article III courts have the task of
adjudicating an ever-mounting volume of cases .... Further, the
entire character of litigation that federal courts principally face is
changing ... . The legislature and the judiciary act responsibly
when they provide and explore new, flexible methods of
adjudication, especially where the evolution of the innovative
mechanism is left in large part under the control of the judiciary
itself.'2
This is the kind of pragmatic focus on congressional interests,
weighed against the intrusion on the judiciary, that Justice White
advocated in Northern Pipeline.
A powerful dissent in the Ninth Circuit case by Judge Schroeder
drew on the Federalist Papers and raised several concerns. 4 First, the
dissent argued that magistrates are impermissibly "beholden to the
Article III judiciary for their appointment, retention, and authority to
decide cases. They are beholden to Congress for their pay."'u
Second, use of magistrates could cause Congress to create fewer
Article III judgeships than would otherwise be needed. Third, the
120. Id. at 545.
121. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1044.
122- Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 545. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution allows
Congress to vest the appointment of inferior federal officers in the President, courts of
law, or department heads. If magistrates are inferior officers, then it's acceptable that the
Article III district judges (courts of law) select them.
123. Id. at 547.
124. Id. at 547-49 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 549 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
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dissent said that the Appointments and Removal Clause was not
satisfied since magistrates hearing Article III cases are not acting as
inferior officers.120 Fourth, consent could not cure the structural
defects "arising from the wholesale delegation of judicial power to
non-Article III judges."'
'1
The dissent elaborated that magistrates may feel conflicted
between doing what is right, and doing what they think will please the
district court judges who could terminate their appointment, assign
them fewer cases, or vacate their current case assignments.29 There is
also the danger of overzealous programs for judicial efficiency which
have occurred in some districts."3' For example, one federal judge in
Chicago had a "rocket docket" in which cases were to be tried
approximately two months after filing, no matter how complex, unless
the attorneys consented to let a magistrate preside.'
This last objection highlights the dissent's skepticism over
whether consent to magistrate trials is truly voluntary.,32 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has even recognized that the
the "pressure on parties to submit cases increases in direct proportion
to the number of magistrate positions."'' Judge Schroeder's dissent
points out that this is coercion, not consent.
Judge Posner wrote a stinging dissent in GerasT" also taking the
view that magistrate trials were an improper delegation of Article III
power. Judge Posner said that magistrates are assistants to Article III
judges and have no more right to try cases than do a judge's law
clerks or secretaries.3 He took the Brennan approach that there are
certain lines that can't be crossed in terms of delegating Article III
power. This is certainly an interesting formalist position for a judge
known to advocate a pragmatic jurisprudence in most other areas.
127. Id. at 549-50 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Article III federal district judges are
viewed as principal officers who must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate under Article II. To the extent that magistrates therefore assume more Article III
judge-type powers, then the fact that they are not appointed by the President becomes
problematic in the dissent's view.
128. Id. at 550 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 552 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 553.
131. I practiced in this judge's court from 1988 to 1993 and learned of his docket
approach firsthand.
132. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 553-54 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 554 (referencing the Third Circuit's decision in Wharton-Thomas v. United
States, 721 F.2d 922 (1983)).
134. 742 F.2d at 1045-54 (Posner, J., dissenting).
135. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1046 (Posner, J., dissenting).
136. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-469 (1990).
Judge Posner had been a law clerk for Justice Brennan on the Supreme Court.
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Neither consent nor appellate review can save the statute from these
structural flaws in Posner's view.
He also rejected the majority's views about the supposed
importance of the magistrate statute reserving the contempt power to
Article III judges. Posner recited statistics to show that the contempt
power "is about as crucial as the robe. The contempt power is rarely
employed in civil trials... The trial judge has other sanctions that
usually are just as effective."1 37 And he explained that courts have
granted litigants such strong procedural protections against being
held in contempt that "there is little practical difference between a
presiding judge and a presiding magistrate so far as the contempt
power is concerned.""z  He then made other arguments for why
efficiency can be no excuse for violating Article III. These anti-
efficiency arguments are certainly interesting coming from the
inventor of the law and economics discipline. Despite the power of
these two dissents, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits found that consent,
combined with the district court's retaining of key powers, removed
any constitutional roadblocks.
(2) A Magistrate's Inherent Contempt Power?
The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed magistrate contempt
powers in the relevantly recent case of Bingman v. Ward. 
Magistrate Judge Erickson was allowed, by consent, to hear and
decide a case in which he ordered prison officials to provide a
prisoner with dental care. Erickson fined the prison after it failed to
comply. The fine amounted to a criminal contempt. The Ninth
Circuit ruled that the magistrate could not issue the criminal
contempt determination, and that he could only make
recommendations under the former version of 28 U.S.C. section
636(e). What was the basis for the Ninth Circuit limiting the
magistrate's power?
The court said there was no real consent. "[T]he prison officials
never did file a consent to the conduct of criminal contempt
proceedings by a magistrate judge. They only consented to the
magistrate judge's jurisdiction under § 636(c) and, as we have said
that does not overcome the removal of [contempt] jurisdiction in Sec.
636(e).""14 Bingman also questioned whether magistrates could ever
137. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1049 (Posner, J., dissenting).
138. Id (Posner, J., dissenting).
139. 100 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1996).
140. Id. at 658. Cf Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d at 907-08 (3d Cir.
1992) (even if a contempt proceeding is treated as a misdemeanor trial, there was no
specific written consent and that creates problems).
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have the contempt power, even with party consent.1 The Ninth
Circuit said that "[t]he power to hold persons in criminal contempt is
not only awesome, but is also an inherent power of Article III
judges."'42
IH. Constitutional Analysis
A review of all the case-law in this area demonstrates that
magistrate contempt powers present three closely related, complex,
constitutional questions: 1) Is there a separation of powers violation
under Article III?; 2) Is there a due process violation?; and 3) Is there
a violation of the delegation doctrine? The close relationship is
shown by the Supreme Court's statement that separation of powers
mainly protect personal interests. Yet one normally associates
personal interests with due process analysis, not with issues regarding
allocations of government powers. Thus, due process and separation
of powers principles seem to overlap here. And almost none of the
Supreme Court decisions have discussed the delegation question.
Despite the above confusing triad, the Supreme Court and
appellate court cases have concentrated on the separation of powers
issue, and that issue is broad enough to encompass both structural
and personal concerns. Thus, I believe the key to resolving the
constitutionality of the FCIA contempt provisions is in conducting a
separation of powers analysis. The initial step must be a descriptive
assessment of how the Supreme Court would likely rule on the
constitutionality of the FCIA contempt provisions.43 A normative
assessment of the Court's likely approach follows.'"
141. The court said:
[M]ore fundamentally "it is well-established that litigants cannot confer [subject
matter] jurisdiction by consent where none exists." (citations omitted) ... To be
blunt about it, Congress has explicitly provided that these criminal contempt
proceedings must be conducted by district judges upon certifications from
magistrate judges. Congress has not given magistrate judges that jurisdiction and
no one-not [even] the parties... can confer that jurisdiction upon them....
Contempt proceedings implicate the authority, the discretion, and the dignity of
Article III courts.
Bingman, 100 F.3d at 658.
142. Id. at 657.
143. It is worth noting that my descriptive view of the Court's position is supportive of
broad magistrate authority where consent is present. Thus, even if I have given an overly
broad interpretation of magistrate power, that nonetheless enhances the legitimacy of my
argument that summary criminal contempt powers for magistrates are unconstitutional. In
other words, I am still arguing that magistrates cannot be given summary criminal
contempt powers without consent even if one assumes virtually the broadest possible
authority for magistrates.
144. Several law review articles have tried to develop their own proposed tests for
determining whether Article III power is impermissibly being negated by delegations of
authority to Article I courts or magistrates. See e.g. Hinde, supra note 70, at 1168-75;
[Vol. 53
NEW CONTEMPT POWERS
A. The Descriptive Assessment and Application
(1) The Summary Criminal Contempt Provision
There are many reasons to think the Court would find the
summary criminal contempt power unconstitutional. Most
importantly, no consent is required, and the magistrate would be
using a power that the Ninth Circuit and other courts have described
as "inherent" to Article III, suggesting that contempt power is an
essential element of a district judge's arsenal. The absence of consent
creates a strong presumption against the magistrate's legitimacy here.
This view is further supported by the scholar who pointed out that
"an adjunct [court] that is not an Article I court but has the power to
enforce its own orders (other than through administrative sanctions)
has not yet been held constitutional.""14 Certainly in 1967, the Judicial
Conference and the Senate had "serious doubts" about giving
magistrates contempt authority.
Second, in summary criminal contempt proceedings, separation
of powers and the defendant's individual rights are violated because
the magistrate is both judge and prosecutor, no formal hearing is
required, and there is no defense counsel, yet jail time is a possible
penalty.146 Moreover, no standard of appellate review is specified in
the FCIA. Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter even said that
summary criminal contempt proceedings fall outside due process
parameters,47 but are a necessary evil for Article III judges. No such
necessity exists for giving non-Article III judge such dramatic powers
when the parties have not consented to such authority.
Third, the most persuasive precedents are on this side. Several
courts have written scholarly opinions which reason convincingly that
it is unconstitutional for Congress to grant contempt power to
bankruptcy judges. Their reasoning can be applied to magistrates!
Laura B. Bartell, Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court - A New Look, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv.
1, 29. Yet the Bartell article is not even about magistrates, and the Hinde article does not
focus on the magistrate contempt issue or on what powers magistrates have when there's
no consent. Thus, these articles are not that helpful here. Another article says that
bankruptcy judges should only be able to recommend contempt like the former version of
the Magistrate's Act. Richard Murphy, Note, Can They Do That? The Due Process and
Article III Problems of Proposed Findings of Criminal Contempt in Bankruptcy Court, 78
MINN. L. REv. 1607 (1994). Certainly this Minnesota article supports my argument that
part of the FCIA contempt provision goes too far.
145. Bartell, supra note 144, at 45.
146. See generally Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV.
345 (2000).
147. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 (1952).
148. An extremely scholarly ruling to this effect is Cox Cotton Co. v. Cryts, 24 B.R. 930
(E.D. Ark. 1982). That case even quotes an important and relevant 1924 law review
article to support its reasoning. Id. at 950 (citing Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress
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Judicial and legislative proponents of the summary contempt
provision, however, respond by saying that magistrates are hampered
because they can't act forcefully against lawyers who show them
disrespect in the courtroom. Moreover, the FCIA penalties are small.
The longest jail sentence it permits magistrates to impose is 30 days.
Thus, the pragmatic balance of interests heavily favors the summary
criminal contempt provision.
Yet the Supreme Court and other authorities have reported that
the magistrate judge system has worked remarkably well, even
though magistrates have been devoid of this supposedly essential
authority.149 Indeed, the legislative history did not include any data or
studies to show this is a widespread problem that has serious effects.
In addition, it would seem to be in the interest of most attorneys not
to irritate magistrates who have significant discretion over many
aspects of their cases including scheduling and the setting of bonds,
not to mention the magistrates' ability to impose sanctions. And
interestingly, virtually all the congressional testimony for this
provision came from magistrates judges or federal judges who have
strong institutional interests and biases in favor of expanding the
magistrate role.15 Thus, the balance of interests here weighs against
constitutionality.
The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts has argued that limited
magistrate criminal contempt power is constitutional because it is
akin to the petty criminal offenses that magistrate judges can try
without consent. Is this analogy right? It would seem not because the
Supreme Court has said that the contempt authority is a "potent
weapon" that can be "deadly" if misapplied.' Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit has referred to the contempt power as "awesome."'52 Why is it
so awesome? As mentioned earlier, separation of powers is basically
negated in summary contempt cases, whereas even a petty crime
defendant at least has his own counsel and faces a prosecutor other
than the judge.'53 The Ninth Circuit specifically stated in Bingman v.
Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts - A Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924)). The Ninth Circuit has expressed
skepticism about bankruptcy contempt power also, though its decision involved statutory
interpretation and not constitutional reasoning. In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827
F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).
149. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 n.5 (1991) (quoting Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)) ("It can hardly be denied that the
system created by the Federal Magistrates Act has exceeded the highest expectations of
the legislators who conceived it.")
150. The absence of any academic testimony in the record is startling.
151. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64,76 (1967).
152. In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827 F.2d at 1285.
153. Moreover, the defendant in a petty criminal case may later have a malicious
prosecution claim available. But the defendant in a consent case cannot sue the
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Ward'" that, "criminal contempt proceedings are not the same as
simple misdemeanor prosecutions." The Ninth Circuit and other
courts therefore reject the petty offense analogy. Moreover, the
Office of Legal Counsel of the United States, in a related context, has
said that reduced penalties don't make a constitutionally suspect
delegation of power to magistrates acceptable.'
One final point worth mentioning is the need for at least some
limit on magistrate power to be established. It is clear that
magistrates would like to wield more power, and many federal judges
think that would ease their dockets too. Yet at some point there
could be no remaining difference between magistrates and district
judges, despite their obviously different Article III status. The
summary contempt area is the logical place to draw a line rather than
open the floodgates and undermine Article III entirely. Several
courts have suggested this is where the line should be drawn.
(2) The Other Criminal and Civil Contempt Provisions
In contrast, the Supreme Court would probably find the other
contempt parts of the FCIA constitutional because they are largely
premised on consent. Indeed these contempt provisions are modeled
after the trial consent provisions which have been upheld by lower
courts. Moreover, greater procedural protections must generally be
afforded the defendant, in non-summary contempts. An example is
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure compared to
Rule 42(a)."6 The structural burdens are not so serious that consent
cannot make up for them.
First, Congress has reasons for providing this limited power to
magistrate judges given the growing federal court caseloads and the
need for magistrates to control those lawyers who have consented to
be in their court. Second, the penalties that can be imposed are small
and the procedural protections with this kind of contempt high (e.g.
the judge is not the prosecutor, the defendant can retain an attorney,
etc.). And third, as Judge Posner pointed out in his Geras dissent,
magistrate judge later for malicious conduct because of judicial immunity.
154. 100 F.3d at 658 (9th Cir. 1996).
155. Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel Director Walter Dellinger, to the
Department of Justice (Dec. 6, 1993) (on how the limited nature of criminal forfeiture
penalties does not mean it's constitutional for magistrates to hear such matters), available
at http://wwv.usdoj.gov/olc/forfeit.htm.
156. Rule 42(b) specifies that non-summary contempts require notice to the defendant
stating "the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of
the defense, and [stating] the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged
and describe it as such." FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). The court there may appoint an
attorney in the contempt proceeding and the defendant may be entitled to a jury trial. By
contrast, summary contempts under Rule 42(a) are handled immediately in front of the
judge who witnessed them with none of those guarantees. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
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statistics show that the contempt power has not been used that much
by district courts over the years. Thus, it seems unlikely that there
will be a "phalanx" of contempt proceedings that will overwhelm
magistrates.
B. The Normative Perspective
From a normative perspective though, and more fundamentally,
I think the Court is wrong in the separation of powers test it employs.
First, consent should not be so important. Second, the balancing of
factors should not be so one-sided whenever consent is present. The
Court errs when it says that the personal interests of the litigants, and
not structural interests, are the major concerns of the separation of
powers doctrine." Separation of powers questions should not turn
largely on the consensual waiver of individual rights.
Indeed, by definition, separation of powers doctrine here should
be about whether Article III power is being denuded. After all,
concerns such as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot usually
be cured by party consent, because fundamental institutional interests
are at stake."8 And the dissenters in Pacemaker argued against
magistrate consent authority to conduct trials, reasoning that it
effectively nullifies Article III.9 Even the Wright and Miller Federal
Practice and Procedure treatise expresses concern about eroding
Article III by giving magistrates too many powers.16 And a related
structural concern, discussed before, is that Congress will not create
more federal judgeships if Congress can solve the problem of
overloaded dockets by giving magistrates more powers. The Article
III judiciary's response in upholding broad magistrate powers might
in the long run actually help Congress aggrandize power.
Moreover, a closer examination of the judicial reasoning in Schor
and Geras shows their consent focus can lead to rather extreme
results. The Court in Schor said that Article III would be violated if
"Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to
157. Several other commentators agree with my view that the major separation of
powers concern here is structural, and that the effect on individual rights is purely
secondary. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why
the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 306 (1981) (noting that
"the due process guarantee of fairness to litigants does not protect the full range of values
sheltered by Article III" and referring to the "structural values" Article III protects);
Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles of Article 111, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1947, 1952-53
(1984).
158. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,851-53 (1986).
159. See e.g., Geras v. LaFayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that magistrates are essentially assistants to Article
III judges and have no more right to try civil or criminal cases that do the judge's
secretary).
160. WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 33, at 399.
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handle the entire business of the Article III courts without Article III
supervision..... This language would seem to suggest that magistrates
can try felony criminal proceedings with consent so long as "the
decision to invoke this [non-Article III] forum is left entirely to the
parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of
these matters is unaffected."'62 Consent in this case could entirely
negate the distinction between district judges and magistrate judges.
How should the balancing be carried out then if consent is not
viewed as the key? Constitutionality should depend on a sliding
scale. The closer the matter is to an essential attribute of Article III
power, the stronger the need to have Article III judges perform the
function. For example, criminal sentencing is a crucial Article III
judicial function, but monitoring the attorney's selection of a jury is
not. Consent remains relevant, but only on a limited basis. Bingman
also seems to support my position in the contempt area. But
unfortunately, the Supreme Court's Schor decision suggests that
consent may be key.
If my approach were adopted, then the FCIA summary criminal
contempt provision would still be found invalid. But the other
contempt provisions might also be thrown out because they involve
core Article III powers being given to non-Article III judges with
little justification. This approach would also provide a principled
basis for why felony trials could never be handled by magistrates even
with party consent. It would therefore mean that if Congress wanted
to have strong independent judges who can control their dockets,
Congress would have to create more of them by filling the existing
federal court vacancies, rather than simply relying on magistrates. In
the long run, this would best reinforce separation of powers.
Conclusion
For the reasons mentioned, the FCIA's summary contempt
provision is probably unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court would
likely uphold the other contempt provisions. So what should
magistrate judges do if they have a terribly obstructive lawyer in their
courtroom and cannot rely on summary criminal contempt? They
should follow Judge Posner's Geras dissent where he suggests they
rely on punitive measures such as sanctions. The Ninth Circuit in
Grimes v. San Francisco63 said that magistrates have the sanctioning
power even though it expressed skepticism about magistrate criminal
contempt power in Bingman. Besides sanctions, magistrates are
undoubtedly experts at keeping lawyers on tight leashes and setting
161. 478 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added).
162- Id
163. 951 F.2d 236, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1991).
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effective case schedules. Moreover, magistrates can still certify
contempt matters for a district judge's examination and ultimate
decision.
Is there any way magistrates can utilize the contempt powers to
minimize the constitutional problems? Magistrate consent forms
could expressly indicate the parties are consenting to the magistrate's
use of the contempt power in appropriate circumstances. In addition,
magistrates should use the power cautiously, such as by employing
the minimum penalty needed. For example, magistrates may wish to
use only a financial penalty and stay away from jailing a lawyer. A
reviewing court could completely reverse a financial penalty, but a
lawyer who has been improperly jailed can never be made fully
whole.
These suggestions should minimize antipathy towards
magistrates' expanding authority. But, for the reasons mentioned
earlier, such precautions do not cure the constitutional flaws in the
new magistrate summary criminal contempt provision. Indeed, it
would be good for the Supreme Court to take this issue head-on and
strike down the provision because it would send a message that
magistrate power can only go so far. After all, this issue involves
nothing less than the federal judiciary's independence.
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